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Experimental subjects are not different 
 
By FILIPPOS EXADAKTYLOS, ANTONIO M. ESPÍN AND PABLO BRAÑAS-GARZA* 
Abstract 
Experiments using economic games are becoming a major source for the 
study of human social behavior. These experiments are usually conducted 
with university students who voluntarily choose to participate. Across the 
natural and social sciences, there is some concern about how this 
“particular” subject pool may systematically produce biased results. 
Focusing on social preferences, this study employs data from a survey-
experiment conducted with a representative sample of a city’s population 
(N=765). We report behavioral data from five experimental decisions in 
three canonical games: dictator, ultimatum and trust games. The dataset 
includes students and non-students as well as volunteers and non-
volunteers. We separately examine the effects of being a student and being 
a volunteer on behavior, which allows a ceteris paribus comparison between 
self-selected students (students*volunteers) and the representative 
population. Our results suggest that self-selected students are an 
appropriate subject pool for the study of social behavior. 
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An introduction on the importance of experimental research using economic 
games is no longer necessary. Economic experiments are well established as 
a useful tool for studying human behavior within social scientists. Over the last 
years however, human experimentation has also found a central place in the 
research agendas of evolutionary biologists (1,2,3,4,5,6), physiologists (7,8, 
9,10,11,12), neuroscientists (13,14,15,16,17,18) and physicists (19,20,21,22, 
23,24). The increasing number of well-published experimental studies and the 
impact they have on various fields across a number of disciplines has touched 
off a lively debate over the degree to which these data can indeed be used to 
refine, falsify and develop new theories, to build institutions and legal 
systems, to inform policy and to even make general inferences about the 
human nature (25,26,27,28,29). In other words, the central issue is now about 
the external validity of the experimental data. 
The main concern about external validity is related to certain features of 
experimental practices on the one hand (high levels of scrutiny, low monetary 
stakes and the abstract nature of the tasks), and a very particular subject pool 
on the other.  
The latter has two dimensions. First, the subject pool in behavioral 
experiments is almost exclusively comprised of university students. More 
than the narrow socio-demographic array of characteristics that this group 
offers, what really threatens external validity is the existence of different 
behavioral patterns once such characteristics have been controlled for. That 
is, the under-representation of certain strata of the population is obviously true 
but not the real issue: once the distribution of these characteristics is known 
for the general population, researchers can account for such differences by 
adjusting the right weights to their statistical models. The real question in 
extrapolating students’ behavior to general populations is whether the 
coefficient estimates differ across the groups due to non-controllable 
variables. We should say that there is student bias if, after controlling for 
socio-demographics, students behave differently than the general population. 
The second dimension is that participants are volunteers. Naturally, the 
behavior of non-volunteers is not observed. There is a self-selection bias if 
volunteers share some attributes that make their behavior systematically 
diverge from that of non-volunteers.  
The concern of the researchers of such biases is echoed by the increasing 
number of studies recruiting other, more general samples. A pronounced 
example is the use of the web in order to recruit subjects using platforms such 
as the Amazon Mechanical Turk (30, 31). Such attempts are very valuable 
since alternative samples are the best way of testing the robustness and 
generality of the results. However without specific information on how the 
alternative subject pool affects the results, leaving the physical laboratory and 
the control that this offers can be time-, energy- and money-consuming 
without necessarily positive returns in terms of generalizability. 
So far insights as to whether student and self-selection biases systematically 
affect behavior can be found mainly in the economics’ literature. Regarding 
student bias there are two main sources. The first comes from experiments 
using both students and individuals pooled from a target population (see for 
example 32,33,34,35,36). These belong to the family of the so-called 
artefactual field experiments (37). The second comes from databases 
containing behavioral data drawn from more general populations. This allows 
researchers to test whether different sub-samples (e.g., students) exhibit 
different behavioral patterns (38,39,40,41,42,43). In the realm of social 
preferences, both practices have been extensively used over the last years, 
giving rise to a large number of field experiments. There is now plenty of 
evidence demonstrating that students are slightly less “pro-social” than other 
groups in a variety of designs and settings. For example students have been 
shown to behave less generously (44,45), less cooperatively (40,42,46,47) 
and less trustfully (48,49). 
However, the bulk of this evidence comes from comparing students who self-
select to experiments with other non-student samples who again self-select. 
So, what this literature gives evidence for is a small student bias but only 
within volunteers. Whether self-selected students’ behavior is representative 
for individuals who are not students and do not volunteer in scientific studies 
(presumably the “median” individual) we cannot know. Nor can we know 
whether self-selected students behave differently than non-self-selected 
students (the majority of the student population); ultimately we cannot know 
whether students in general are less pro-social than non-students (either self-
selected or not). Thus, responding to concerns about student bias requires 
the simultaneous study of self-selection bias, which ultimately implies looking 
also within non-student populations 
Concerning self-selection bias, research has been relatively limited since this 
involves obtaining behavioral data of individuals not willing to participate to 
experiments. For student populations, researchers get hold of such datasets 
by making participation semi-obligatory during a class (50,51). However, there 
are good reasons to assume that the behavior of these pseudo-volunteers will 
be quite distinct of the non-volunteers’ due to prominent demand effects (52). 
Indeed both (50) in a Dictator Game where the recipient was a charity and 
(51) in a Trust Game found pseudo-volunteers to behave more “pro-socially”, 
which is in accordance of such hypothesis. Such effects could be even more 
pronounced when the experimenter is a professor of that specific class or 
course. The most recent evidence concerning self-selection (49) compares 
the frequency of a non-experimental decision (i.e., donation to a fund) 
between students who self-select to experiments and students who do not 
and finds no difference. Focusing on non-student populations, an appropriate 
dataset is even more difficult to obtain. We are aware of only two studies. (47) 
compares truck drivers (a kind of pseudo-volunteers) with volunteers sampled 
from a non-student population in a social dilemma game. (48) compares the 
distribution of attributes between participants of a survey who decide to 
participate in an experiment and those who decide not to. Both studies report 
non-significant differences. 
Summarizing, the literature is not conclusive on whether self-selection is an 
issue in extrapolating experimental subjects’ behavior into other groups. Even 
less on whether self-selection affects students and non-students in the same 
way since differences in methodologies (regarding whether the comparison is 
about attributes or decisions, whether the latter are experimental or non-
experimental and more importantly whether the same design and recruitment 
procedures were followed) do not allow comparisons. 
So, studies on student and self-selection bias, taken together suggest that 
studying the representativeness of subjects’ social behavior requires the 
simultaneous examination of student bias within both volunteers and non-
volunteers and self-selection bias within both students and non-students. 
Using the 2x2 factorial design depicted in Figure 1a, we report data from a 
large-scale survey-experiment that allows such a ceteris paribus investigation 
of student and self-selection bias.  
 
 
Figure 1: Experimental design sample classification 
A representative sample of a city’s adult population participated in three 
experimental games (Dictator Game (DG), Ultimatum Game (UG), and Trust 
Game (TG)) involving five decisions (see Figure 2). In addition, a rich socio-
demographic set of information was gathered in order to serve as controls, 
which are necessary in order to isolate student and self-selection effects. 
Lastly, each individual was classified as a volunteer or non-volunteer based 
on their willingness to participate in future experiments in the laboratory (see 
Methods). Our final sample (N=765 after excluding incomplete observations) 
therefore consists of both students and non-students as well as both 
volunteers and non-volunteers (see Figure 1b). 
 
 Figure 2: Experimental decisions 
 
Results 
As Figure 1b illustrates, our final sample consists of: 
• 22% students (n=170).  
• 46% volunteers (n=350). 
• 12% “standard” subject pool (students x volunteers) (n=90). 
The first models (left-hand side) in each column of Table 1 report the 
estimated main effects of being a student and a volunteer on behavior. The 
second models explore the interaction effects of the two (student x volunteer). 
These models allow student bias to be studied separately within volunteers 
and non-volunteers and in the same manner, self-selection bias within 
students and non-students. The regressions in columns i, ii, and iii model 
participants’ offers in the DG, the UG and the difference between the two, 
thus capturing strategic behavior, respectively. Columns iv, v, and vi repeat 
the same exercise for the minimum acceptable offer (MAO) as a second 
mover in the UG, the decision to pass money or not in the binary TG, and the 
decision to return money or not as a second mover in the same game, 
respectively. Note that in all regressions we control for basic socio-
demographics (age, sex, income and educational level) as well as for risk and 
time preferences, cognitive abilities and social capital as possible confounding 
factors.  
…. Table 1: Student and self-selection biases on behavior … 
Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates from the between-group comparisons 
obtained by the corresponding Wald tests on Table 1 models. 
Student bias: Students are more strategic players (p=0.012) mostly because 
they make less generous DG offers (p=0.060). However, these differences 
are never larger than 6% of the pie. Through Wald tests, we identify the 
student bias to be mainly manifested among volunteers (A vs. C, p=0.028; 
see Table 2).  
Self-selection bias: Volunteers are more likely to both trust (6.6%, marginal 
effects corresponding to the probit estimates reported in Tables 1 and 2) and 
to reciprocate the trust (7.7%) than non-volunteers in the TG (p=0.051 and 
p=0.011, respectively). However, the first difference vanishes when making 
pairwise comparisons within groups. That is, the aggregate effect is not 
specifically attributable to either students (A vs. B) or non-students (C vs. D) 
(p>0.12 in both cases). The second difference can be essentially traced back 
to non-students (p=0.023) since it is largely insignificant for students 
(p=0.440). Nonetheless, self-selection bias slightly affects students as well: 
self-selected students make (marginally) significantly higher offers than the 
rest of students in the UG (p=0.084). 
As a final exercise we compare self-selected students with both the rest of the 
sample (A vs. B+C+D) and group D, which comprises non-students, non-
volunteers as an estimation of the subject-pool bias. We find the behavior of 
group A to be different from the rest of the sample only regarding UG offers, 
and at marginally significant levels (p=0.092), as they offer €0.66 more (3.3% 
of the pie). As can be inferred from Table 2, this effect must be emanating 
from the self-selection bias revealed in this decision among students. The 
comparison between groups A and D yields only one (marginally) significant 
result as well. Self-selected students increase their offers between DG and 
UG by €0.94 more than non-self-selected, non-students (p=0.094). This effect 
makes sense as well since students have been reported previously to be 
more strategic players than non-students (A+B vs. C+D). Finally, since self-
selection was revealed to be an issue only among non-students (C vs. D), the 
absence of significant differences in TG behavior (ps>0.49) is not surprising. 
…. Table 2: Between-group comparisons…. 
Due to the complex interpretation of non-linear interaction effects (53), we 
replicate the regressions of columns iv, v, and vi using one dummy for each 
group (A, B, C, and D). The results remain exactly the same. Additionally, 
replication of the regressions using alternative classification of students does 
not alter the general picture (see Methods and Tables S2 - S4 in the 
supplementary materials). 
 
Discussion 
This paper presents data that allows disentangling the separate effects of 
student and self-selection bias. Evidence for both is found. However, the 
results also tell another parallel story: in five experimental decisions and 
following the exact same procedures for all subjects, self-selected students 
have been proven to behave in a very similar manner with every other group 
separately and in combination. Indeed, at the conventional 5% level only one 
significant effect concerning self-selected students is observed and, in 
addition, the difference is economically small. That said, we suggest that the 
findings do not discredit the use of self-selected students in experiments 
measuring social preferences. Rather the opposite: the convenient sample of 
self-selected college students that allowed a boom in human experimentation 
in both social and natural sciences produces qualitatively and quantitatively 
accurate results. Models on human social behavior, evolutionary dynamics 
and social networks together with the implications that they bare are not in 
danger from this particular subject pool. The results caution, however, on the 
use of alternative samples such as self-selected non-students that typically 
participate in artefactual field and internet experiments, aimed at better 
representativeness, since the effect of self-selection can be even more 
pronounced outside the student community (self-selection bias is proved to be 
an issue mainly among non-students in the Trust Game).  
Methods 
The experiment took place from November 23rd to December 15th 2010. A 
total of 835 individuals aged between 16 and 91 years old participated in the 
experiment. One out of ten participants was randomly selected to be paid. 
The average earnings among winners, including those winning nothing 
(18.75%), were €9.60. 
Sampling: A stratified random method was used to obtain the sample. In 
particular, the city of Granada (Spain) is divided into nine geographical 
districts, which served as sampling strata. Within each stratum we applied a 
proportional random method to minimize sampling errors. In particular, the 
sample was constructed in four sequential steps: 1. We randomly selected a 
number of sections proportional to the number of sections within each district; 
2. We randomly selected a number of streets proportional to the number of 
streets within each section; 3. We randomly selected a number of buildings 
proportional to the number of buildings on each street; 4. Finally, we randomly 
selected a number of apartments proportional to the number of apartments 
within each building. This method ensures a geographically representative 
sample. Detailed information can be found in supplementary materials. 
Our sample consists of individuals who agreed to complete the survey at the 
moment the interviewers asked them to participate. Being interviewed in their 
own apartments decreased opportunity cost (thus increasing the participation 
rate). In order to control for selection bias within households, only the 
individual who opened the door was allowed to participate. Lastly, the data 
collection process was well distributed across both daytime and weekday. Our 
sampling procedure resulted in a representative sample in terms of age and 
sex (see Table S7 in the supplementary materials). 
Interviewers: The data were collected by 216 university students (grouped in 
108 pairs) enrolled in a course on field experiments in the fall of 2010. The 
students underwent ten hours of training in the methodology of economic field 
experiments, conducting surveys, and sampling procedures. Their performan-
ce was carefully monitored through a web-based system (details in the 
supplementary materials). 
Protocol: The interviewers introduced themselves to the prospective 
participants and explained that they were carrying out a study for the 
University of Granada. Upon agreement to participate, the participants were 
informed that the data would be used for scientific purposes only and under 
conditions of anonymity according to the Spanish law on data protection. One 
interviewer always read the questions aloud, while the other noted down the 
answers (with the exception of the experimental decisions). The survey lasted 
on average 40 minutes and consisted of three parts. In the first part, extensive 
socioeconomic information of the participants was collected including, among 
others, risk and time preferences, and social capital. In the second part, 
participants played three paradigmatic games of research on social 
preferences, namely the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game and the Trust 
Game (see Figure 2). In the last part, they had to state their willingness to 
participate in future monetary-incentivized experiments (which would take 
place in the laboratory at the School of Economics). 
Experimental Games: At the beginning of the second part, and before any 
details were given about each decision in particular, the participants received 
some general information about the nature of the experimental economic 
games according to standard procedures. In particular, participants were 
informed that: 
• The five decisions involved real monetary payoffs coming from a 
national research project endowed with a specific budget for this 
purpose. 
• The monetary outcome would depend only on the participant’s decision 
or on both his/her own and another randomly matched participant’s 
decision, whose identity would forever remain anonymous.  
• One of every ten participants would be randomly selected to be paid, 
and the exact payoff would be determined by a randomly selected role. 
In deciding 1/10 instead of higher probabilities (for instance 1/5), we 
took into account two issues: the cognitive effects of using other 
probabilities and the (commuting) costs of paying people given the 
dispersion of participants throughout the city. Interestingly, 297 
subjects (39% of the sample) believed that they would be selected to 
be paid (last item of the second part). 
• Matching and payment would be implemented within the next few days. 
• The procedures ensured absolute double-blinded anonymity by using a 
decision sheet, which they would place in the envelope provided and 
then seal. Thus, participants’ decisions would remain forever blind in 
the eyes of the interviewers, the researchers, and the randomly 
matched participant. 
Once the general instructions had been given, the interviewer read the details 
for each experimental decision separately. After every instruction set, 
participants were asked to write down their decisions privately and proceed to 
the next task. To control for possible order effects on decisions, the order both 
between and within games was randomized across participants, resulting in 
24 different orders (always setting aside the two decisions of the same game). 
In the Dictator and Ultimatum Game (proposer) participants had to split a pie 
of €20 between themselves and another anonymous participant. Subjects 
decided which share of the €20 they wanted to transfer to the other 
participant. In the case of the Ultimatum Game, implementation was upon 
acceptance of the offer by the randomly matched responder; in case of 
rejection neither participant earned anything. For the role of the responder in 
the Ultimatum Game we used the strategy method in which subjects had to 
state their willingness to accept or reject each of the proposals depicted in 
Figure 2. In the Trust Game, the trustor (1st pl.) had to decide whether to pass 
€10 or €0 to the trustee (2nd pl.). In case of passing €0, the trustor earned €10 
and the trustee nothing. If she passed €10, the trustee would receive €40 
instead of €10 (money was being quadrupled). The trustee, conditional on the 
trustor having passed the money had to decide whether to send back €22 and 
keep €18 for himself or keep all €40 without sending anything back, in which 
case the trustor did not earn anything (see the supplementary materials). 
Classifying students: Individuals between 18 and 26 years old who reported to 
be studying at the moment were classified as students. The upper age bound 
(26 years old) was selected taking into account the mean maximum age of the 
lab experiments taken place in the University of Granada and a large drop in 
the age histogram of our sample. In order to address potential concerns 
regarding this classification, alternative ways of classifying students were 
used. In particular we replicated the analysis setting the upper bounds at 24 
and 28 years old. Moreover, we did the same classifying as “students” all 
individuals who have ever been in the university, without posing any age limit 
whatsoever. Results in the three cases remained the same in essence. The 
regressions can be found in the supplementary materials. 
Classifying volunteers: Following Van Lange et al. (54) in their application of 
the measure developed by McClintock and Allison (55), we classified 
participants according to the response to the following question: 
“At the School of Economics we invite people to come to make decisions with 
real money like the ones you made earlier (the decisions in the envelope). If 
we invite you, would you be willing to participate?” 
Note, however that we have intentionally removed any helping framing. Van 
Lange et al. (54, pg. 281) for example first stated: “the quality of scientific 
research of psychology at the Free University depends to a large extent on 
the willingness of students to participate in these studies” and then proceeded 
in asking them their willingness to participate in future studies. It is also 
important to mention that the willingness to participate in future experiments 
was stated before matching between participants and payments were done. 
So, by design, the variable of interest could not have been affected by the 
outcome of the games. 
Furthermore, in order to differentiate self-selection in economic experiments 
from the general propensity to help research studies and the need for social 
approval (see 25), we also asked individuals about their willingness to 
participate in future surveys. A total of 478 stated that they would be willing to 
participate in future surveys, while only 350 said they would participate in 
experiments. Of these, 49 stated that they would not participate in a survey. In 
addition, two months after the experiment, we hired an assistant to call all the 
individuals classified as volunteers in order to confirm their interest. In 
particular, we requested participants’ authorization to include their data in the 
experimental dataset of the Economics Department (ORSEE) (56). Of those 
who we were able to contact after two attempts on two consecutive days 
(60%), 97% of students and 83% of non-students confirmed their interest. Not 
answering the phone makes sense if we consider the enormous amount of 
telemarketing calls people receive in Spain and even more so given that the 
assistant made calls from a university phone number which is comprised of 13 
digits like those of telemarketing companies. Note that regular private 
numbers in Spain have 9 digits. 
This method of classifying volunteers raises some concerns. In particular, the 
stated preference regarding the willingness to participate in future 
experiments is never realized. Despite our attempts to ensure that this was 
not just cheap talk (by being granted permission to add individuals’ personal 
details in ORSEE) the matter of the fact is that we do not know with certainty 
whether those classified as volunteers are indeed volunteers. Actually, 
completely separating volunteers and non-volunteers is a virtually impossible 
task. The very idea of volunteering is a continuous quality instead. However, 
by definition, classification requires a line to be drawn. We believe that this 
classification method provides a rather clean way to separate ‘more’ self-
selected from ‘less’ self-selected individuals. 
A second concern is related to the fact that our sample consists of only 
individuals who had accepted to fill in a survey. In other words it seems that 
we study self-selection using an already self-selected sample. Note however 
that individuals have been self-selected into filling in a survey and not into 
participating in a lab experiment. In addition our procedures decreased 
opportunity costs for participants minimizing this type of self-selection. So, 
individuals had to fill in the questionnaire in the comfort of their houses and 
without any ex-ante commitment for the future, in contrast to most nation-wide 
surveys (CentER, SOEP, BHPS, etc.). Actually, 38% of the participants were 
unwilling to participate in a future survey while 54% were not willing to 
participate in a lab experiment. This allowed us to observe experimental 
behavior of people not willing to participate in lab experiments, playing with 
real money and what is more doing so voluntarily.  
Of course it can still be true that we are missing one “extreme” category; 
those who had refused participation in the survey in the first place. Even in 
this case however, if self-selection does indeed affect behavior, it should do 
so even in the absence of this extreme category. 
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 Table 1: Student and self-selection biases on behavior 
 DG 
i 
UG 
ii 
UG-DG 
iii 
MAO 
iv 
TG trustor 
v 
TG trustee 
vi 
students -0.060* (0.032) 
-0.067  
(0.044) 
0.007    
(0.015) 
-0.006    
(0.021) 
0.054** 
(0.021) 
0.047     
(0.030) 
-0.039   
(0.105) 
-0.079  
(0.165) 
-0.167    
(0.152) 
-0.242    
(0.198) 
-0.083   
(0.143) 
-0.034     
(0.191) 
volunteers 0.039     (0.026) 
0.036     
(0.024) 
0.023     
(0.015) 
0.016     
(0.016) 
-0.010   
(0.019) 
-0.013   
(0.019) 
0.019     
(0.092) 
0.000     
(0.112) 
0.196*     
(0.101) 
0.159     
(0.103) 
0.239**   
(0.094) 
0.266**   
(0.117) 
students x 
volunteers  
0.013     
(0.052)  
0.027     
(0.027)  
0.013     
(0.039)   
0.0769     
(0.201)  
0.149     
(0.259)  
-0.096     
(0.268) 
R2     0.0941 0.0943 0.0223 0.0224 0.0600 0.0604 0.1012 0.1013 
LR 3.80*** 3.79*** 1.46** 1.46** 5.81*** 5.68*** 56.02*** 56.60*** 78.49*** 81.52*** 98.87*** 98.20*** 
Notes: The dependent variables are (i) the fraction offered in DG; (ii) the fraction offered in UG; and (iii) the fraction offered in UG - the fraction 
offered in DG; (iv) the minimum acceptable offer as a fraction of the pie in UG; (v) TG decision as a trustor - 1 if (s)he makes the loan, zero 
otherwise; and (vi) TG decision as a trustee - 1 if (s)he returns part of the loan, zero otherwise. Models i and ii are Tobit regressions, model iii is an 
OLS regression; model iv is an ordered probit regression, while the last two models are Probit regressions. N=765 in all regressions. Controls are: 
age, gender, education, household income, social capital, risk preferences, time preferences, and cognitive abilities. The variables are explained in 
depth in the supplementary materials. All models are also controlling for order effects. All the likelihood ratios (LR) shown correspond to Chi2 
statistics, except for column iii, where they are based on F. Robust SE clustered by interviewer (108 groups) and presented in brackets. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Table 2: Between-group comparisons 
      DG UG UG-DG MAO TG trustor TG trustee 
Student bias        
(A+B) vs (C+D) -0.060* 0.008 0.054** -0.039 -0.168 -0.083 
A vs C -0.031 0.021 0.061** -0.002 -0.093 -0.130 
B vs D -0.068 -0.007 0.047 -0.079 -0.242 -0.034 
Self-selection bias         
(A+C) vs (B+D) 0.040 0.023 -0.010 0.020 0.197* 0.240** 
A vs B 0.051 0.044* 0.000 0.078 0.309 0.170 
C vs D 0.037 0.017 -0.013 0.001 0.159 0.266** 
Subject-pool bias         
A vs (B+C+D) -0.012 0.033* 0.039 0.021 0.080 0.049 
A 
 
vs 
 
D 
 
-0.017 
 
0.038 
 
0.047* 
 
-0.002 
 
0.067 
 
0.136 
 
Notes: Letters A, B, C and D refer to the groups depicted in Figure 1a. Group A denotes students, 
volunteers; B students, non-volunteers; C non-students, volunteers; D non-students, non-
volunteers. (A+B) correspond to all students (volunteers and non-volunteers); (C+D) to all non-
students (volunteers and non-volunteers); (A+C) to all volunteers (students and non-students); 
(B+D) to all non-volunteers (students and non-students). Lastly (B+C+D) correspond to the sum 
of the subject pool except students volunteers. *, ** indicate significance at the 0.10, and 0.05 
levels, respectively. Comparisons based on Wald tests from models of Table 1. 
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